they talk about -the intentionality of bodily sensation and perception -is not news either.
What is controversial is whether there is a distinctive kind of conscious or phenomenal intentionality associated with conscious thought (see e.g. Pitt 2004;
Bayne and Montague 2011). This is not something which is implied by the very idea of an intentionalist theory of consciousness. It is possible to hold that all consciousness is intentional, or representational, without holding that conscious thinking has any distinctive phenomenology of its own. Michael Tye, for example, is a well-known defender of intentionalism about consciousness; but recently he has explicitly denied that thoughts have 'a further phenomenology over and above the imagistic and sensory phenomenology that may accompany conscious thoughts ' (2009: 201) . For Tye, there is only imagistic or sensory phenomenal consciousness;
and since all consciousness is intentional, there is only imagistic or sensory phenomenal intentionality.
However, I am persuaded by the arguments of Kriegel (2007) , Pitt (2004) , Strawson (1995) and others that there is a distinctive kind of phenomenal intentionality associated with conscious thought: thought has a so-called 'proprietary phenomenology'. But I will not attempt to argue for this here. Rather, I am attempting something more modest: to sketch an account of the structure of conscious thinking, in order to make it intelligible how thought can be conscious in the same sense as sensations and sensory experiences.
In the next section, I will argue that two well-known theories of consciousness fail to give an adequate answer to the question of why thoughts and sensations are both conscious, and that Block's claim that 'conscious' is ambiguous also fails to answer this question in a satisfactory way. I will then argue in section 3 that my approach to Block's distinction also helps to illuminate what is sometimes called (I think misleadingly) conscious belief. In section 4 I show the bearing of these points about belief on the phenomenon of conscious thought, and hence on the thesis of phenomenal intentionality.
Two inadequate answers to our question
Some popular theories of consciousness, it seems to me, are unable to give a single account of the consciousness involved in thought and in sensation. One is the theory that consciousness involves the instantiation of intrinsic, non-intentional properties, since my question is the general one of whether such a view can possibly apply both to conscious thought and to conscious sensation.
In the case of thought, it might seem a plausible approach: what it is to have a conscious thought is to be conscious of your thought, and what is being conscious of a thought other than representing it? (Lycan 2001 uses this point as part of his 'simple argument' for a higher-order theory of consciousness.) The point is not indisputable, but it has something to be said for it. (In §4 below I will dispute it.)
Yet in the case of sensation, being conscious of a sensation cannot be understood simply in terms of representing it. We can envisage creatures who are incapable of thought about their mental states but nonetheless can feel sensationsurely many animals are actually like this. And even in our own case, the consciousness of a sensation is plausibly something which is internal to the sensation itself, rather than a product of thought or representation of it. 'Conscious of' does not always mean 'representing'. Being conscious of a pain in one's toe -in the sense of being aware of it when you have it -is a different thing from being conscious of the pain when you think about it and attend to it. Merely having the pain, in normal cases, is sufficient for awareness of it.
One way to respond to the inadequacies of these two theories is to say that each is right in its own way -the qualia theory is on the right lines when it comes to conscious sensation, while the higher-order thought theory is on the right lines when it comes to conscious thought. This is either because 'consciousness' is ambiguous, or because there are two (or more) kinds of consciousness; or these might be two ways of saying the same thing. I will briefly examine the best-known version of this proposal: Ned Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness.
In his original (1995) presentation of the distinction, Block said that '"consciousness" is an ambiguous word, though the ambiguity I have in mind is not one I've found in any dictionary ' (Block 1995: 391) . Phenomenal consciousness he defines in a usual way as 'experience: what makes a state phenomenally conscious is that there is something "it is like" to be in that state ' (Block 1995: 380) . Access consciousness is defined for representations, and in terms of these representations' role in reasoning and control of action: 'a representation is access-conscious if it is poised for free use in reasoning and for direct "rational" control of action and speech ' (1995: 382) . In later writings on this subject (e.g. Block 2002), Block modified his presentation somewhat, to answer criticism suggested by his choice of terminology.
To indicate that he is using the words in a more technical sense, he called phenomenal consciousness 'P-consciousness' and access consciousness 'A-consciousness'. For Block, sensations are the paradigms of P-conscious states, while propositional attitudes (e.g. belief) are the paradigms of A-conscious states (2002: 281) .
Could this be the answer to my question, then: that sensations are phenomenally (P) conscious, and thoughts are merely access (A) conscious? On the face of it, the answer seems to be no, for two reasons. First, thoughts can be phenomenally conscious too, as we noted above, in a perfectly ordinary sense of 'phenomenal'. When consciously thinking about something, things can appear to you a certain way -you might be imagining something, reflecting on it intellectually, or preoccupied by memories of it. But all these cases involve the appearance of things in the world, and (as we noted above) this is the original meaning of 'phenomenal'. It is , of course, common these days to use the word 'phenomenal' to apply only to sensory consciousness. But even if one were to restrict the word in this way, visual imagination still counts as thinking, even though it involves sensory 'phenomenal' qualities. So if visually imagining can be a kind of thinking, then some thinking can be phenomenally conscious, in the broader or narrower sense of that word.
The second reason why Block's distinction cannot be straightforwardly used for answering our question is that sensations themselves can be available to reasoning systems; they are accessible for verbal report; they are available to memory, and so I don't think it is particularly helpful here to identify A-consciousness with information-processing, as Block does. It's not just that there is nothing in the idea of processing information which requires that it be conscious (although this is true). It's rather that all the paradigm examples of cognitive information-processing which we have are examples of things that take place unconsciously. Block may say that this is to use the word 'conscious' in the phenomenal sense. But the difficulty is that everyone will agree that much of our psychological information-processing is unconscious. What is it, then, that distinguishes the A-conscious informationprocessing from the unconscious?
Block is sensitive to the criticism that a creature who only had Aconsciousness in his sense would (in some intuitive sense) be an unconscious creature, but nonetheless insists that it is worth calling A-consciousness a kind of consciousness. As he points out, the access-related notion is the notion used in some psychoanalytic discourse -when one has an unconscious desire in something like the Freudian sense, it is one that one cannot access. And the notion of consciousness as accessibility or reportability is also used in much psychology and cognitive neuroscience. These are his reasons for insisting that if a creature were purely Aconscious, it would still be conscious in an ordinary sense. But he concedes that 'A-consciousness can be a kind of consciousness even if it is parasitic on a core notion of P-consciousness ' (2002: 282) .
I think Block is quite right to make this concession. But how should we spell out the idea that A-consciousness is parasitic on P-consciousness? I think the connection is simpler than Block says. The idea that there is an interesting category of states which we can access is (in general) quite true. And we should understand access in terms of availability to other processes and cognitive systems in the way Block says. Assuming that accessing something is bringing something about, then we
can ask: what kind of thing is brought about? The obvious answer is: a phenomenally conscious occurrence. To access or 'broadcast' a mental state is to bring about a change in phenomenal consciousness. So understood, accessing our mental states is not a special kind of consciousness, but rather a matter of bringing those mental states to phenomenal consciousness. This understanding of 'access' (or 'broadcasting') presupposes phenomenal consciousness.
However, it does not follow from the fact that some essentially non-conscious state S brings about a change in phenomenal consciousness that S itself is made 
'Occurrent' and 'conscious' belief
It is frequently said that there is a distinction between beliefs which are conscious and those which are unconscious. Some go further: Christopher Peacocke has attempted to define the concept of belief partly in terms of the idea of conscious belief:
A relational conception R is that of belief only if the following condition is met:
(F) The thinker finds the first-person content that he stands in R to the content p primitively compelling whenever he has the conscious belief that p, and he finds it compelling because he has that conscious belief. (Peacocke 1993: 163) For Peacocke's definition to be intelligible, there must be an intelligible distinction between conscious and unconscious belief. But what is this distinction?
Some theories attempt to explain the distinction in terms of lower-order versus higher-order attitudes: D.H. Mellor, for example, has argued that a conscious belief in a proposition is simply the belief that one believes it (1977: 90). Mellor's proposal resembles the higher-order thought theory defended by Rosenthal (1986) . But unlike Rosenthal, he does not think it is the correct account of all forms of consciousness.
Others explain conscious belief in terms of the idea of an 'occurrent' belief, which is distinguished from 'dispositional' belief. Here I will focus on this latter thesis: that conscious belief is occurrent belief. When we identify what is wrong with this thesis, it will show us what is wrong with the idea of conscious belief as higher-order belief.
The reasons for taking beliefs to be dispositions -to combine with other mental states to cause actions or other mental occurrences -are well known, and I will not dwell on them here.
2 Belief understood as a disposition is sometimes contrasted with occurrent belief, usually in order to identify and describe the phenomenon of 'conscious belief'. Uriah Kriegel, for example, argues that we should 'construe a conscious belief as one that is at once an occurrent first-order belief and an occurrent second-order belief ' (Kriegel 2004: 108; see also BonJour 1999: 131) .
Kriegel implies that the distinction between first-and second-order beliefs is not sufficient to pick out the conscious beliefs: the beliefs must be occurrent too.
An occurrent belief is presumably supposed to be a kind of occurrence: that is, an event or episode. A disposition is a different kind of thing: a state or property, something that persists beyond its manifestations (which are themselves occurrences).
So an occurrent belief cannot be the very same thing as a dispositional belief, any more than a breaking can be the very same thing as an instance of fragility (pace Gennaro 1996: 41). It cannot be right to say that the very same belief state is both conscious and unconscious, if 'conscious belief' is understood as occurrent belief.
What must be meant (at least) by saying that a conscious belief is the same as an unconscious belief is that it has the same content: these are states in which you believe the same thing (i.e. the same proposition). But the state also needs to involve accepting or endorsing that content, if it is to be anything like a belief. As Laurence hard to see how whatever occurrence it is that is being labeled by the words 'occurrent belief' can have these distinguishing marks.
The essence of belief, I take it, is that it is taking something to be the case. We could also say that a belief is taking something to be true, so long as this does not imply that in order to have beliefs, a believer must have the concept of truth. This is a more controversial thesis, and should not be built into the minimal idea of belief which all should accept. Likewise, a believer (in this minimal sense) need not have the concept of something's being the case. In this sense, a relatively simple creature can have beliefs, so long as it takes the world to be a certain way, or takes certain things to be the case.
'Taking something to be the case' could be understood in terms of perceptual
consciousness, where what is taken to the case is present to the mind at the moment it is perceived. But this is not how it is with belief: belief is not just a matter of taking something to be the case for the duration of (e.g.) a perceptual experience. Rather, it is essential to beliefs that they persist through changes of in current consciousness.
Beliefs are stored in memory and can be called upon when future action is needed. It is crucial that they do this if they are to guide the actions of organisms in the way they
do. An organism which could only take things to be the case as they perceptually seem at the present moment would have to learn anew each fact about its environment. It's hard to know whether there are any such creatures, but it is clear enough that we and other believers are not like this.
When a belief is formed, by perception or by other means, it can be stored in the organism's mind and then can be put at the service of the organism's projects in various ways -either by guiding action, by being used in reasoning or by being used in planning. For beliefs to play this functional role, they must continue to exist -that is, persist -beyond the moment of their acquisition.
This feature of beliefs is reflected in our commonsense psychological understanding: we do not count someone as stopping believing something when they go to sleep, lose consciousnesss, or when the subject-matter of their belief is not before their conscious mind. A defender of 'conscious beliefs' must say that this is one of the reasons that we should recognize the phenomenon of unconscious belief: in descriptions of this phenomenon, we are typically invited to think of all the things which we believe which have rarely, if ever, come before our conscious mind. This is quite right -but it is rarely recognized that since the persisting character of belief is essential to it, it makes conscious belief hard to understand.
If a conscious belief were an occurrence, it would exist for as long as that occurrence were to exist. For a belief to cease to be conscious, then, on this understanding, would be for the occurrence to cease, or to go out of existence. But if the occurrence thus went out of existence -for example, when the subject paid attention to something else, or became unconscious -then it cannot play the essential role of belief as I have characterized it. So whatever such an occurrence is, it cannot be belief: 'occurrent belief' is not belief at all. What is undeniable is that there is such a thing as bringing what you know to mind, or to consciousness. Bringing X to mind is without question an occurrence; but this fact on its own does not make 'bringing X to mind' a special kind of X. One could stipulate here, and say that all that is meant by calling a belief 'occurrent' is that it is one which you are bringing to mind, or bringing to consciousness, or consciously attending to. This is how I understand a remark like this of Graham Oddie's: 'a belief is occurrent if it is the belief that you are consciously attending to ' (Oddie 2005: 240) .
Whatever the merits of such a stipulation, it clearly isn't supposed to be part of an explanation of consciousness, since it assumes the idea of 'consciously attending' to something. This is not an objection to the stipulation as such; it is just to point out what the stipulation is, and is not, supposed to be doing.
Nonetheless, whatever stipulations we make, we should accept that there is such a thing as attending to what we know and believe. 'Bringing what we believe to consciousness' is a good description of this, however this notion should be further understood. 5 And it is plausible that this is the same phenomenon as the phenomenon Block calls 'A-consciousness'. I argued above that we should understand Block's notion of A-consciousness in terms of bringing about a phenomenally conscious episode. That is, a state is A-conscious when it is accessible to consciousness, where this is understood in terms of being available to figure in an episode or occurrence in phenomenal consciousness. This is also how I think we should understand the talk of conscious belief.
As I argued in the previous section, we should not say that A-consciousness is a distinct sort of consciousness simply because it is a disposition to bring about events in phenomenal consciousness. And the same applies to the idea of 'conscious belief'.
Just as, on Block's view, a representation is 'A-conscious' when it can be brought to phenomenal consciousness, so a belief is 'conscious' or 'occurrent' when it can be brought to phenomenal consciousness. 'Occurrent' in 'occurrent belief' is a sort of transferred epithet: what is conscious is not the belief itself, but the episode of being conscious of that belief.
It is important to emphasise that bringing a belief to consciousness is not just a matter of being aware of its content -since, as we saw above, the same content can be What the philosophy of consciousness needs, then, is the distinction between occurrences and persisting states. 6 Events and processes are both occurrences: they take time, they can unfold over time and have temporal parts. My watching a bird catching a worm in the garden is an event, as is the event I am watching. Both events take time, they unfold or develop over time, they typically consist of earlier parts or periods. Maybe there are also instantaneous events; in which case, not all events have significant temporal parts. But nonetheless, an instantaneous event is still an occurrence: something that happens.
States do not unfold or evolve over time: they consist in the instantiation of properties and/or relations in objects. If we think of an object as changing its statee.g. its temperature -this is not because the state itself evolves over time, but because one state is followed by a different one. This is because states do not have temporal parts. My having the height I do is a state of me; it makes no sense to talk about the earlier part or the later part of my having the height I do.
D.H. Mellor once distinguished between objects and events by saying that unlike events, objects are 'wholly present' at each moment of their existence (1981: 104) . This distinction can be used also to distinguish between events and states. An event with temporal parts cannot be wholly present throughout each moment of its existence: at any moment at which the event is 'going on' or happening, some temporal parts of the event exist or are present, and others do not. This is not true with states. Consider a state which consists in an instantiation of a property in a particular over a period of time (note that I am not saying that all states have this structure; this is just an example). The property and the particular are wholly present at each moment of the state's existence or instantiation. If the particular ceases to have this property, then it undergoes a change of state. The change itself is an occurrence, but the resulting state is not.
It is the distinction between occurrences and states which gives the nonmetaphorical backbone to William James's famous image of a stream of consciousness:
Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instant. It is nothing jointed: it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let is call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. (James 1890: 233)
The image of a stream flowing suggests motion, and one thing following another. But 'following' in the case of consciousness must mean following in time. Events follow one other in time; objects do not (see Davidson 1967: 691) . A cat can literally follow a mouse in space (e.g. around a room), but the event of the cat's eating the mouse 'follows' the event of the cat's catching the mouse only in its temporal ordering.
Of course, states too can be ordered in time, since they are defined in terms of objects, properties and times. States can be ordered as their constituent times are ordered: as earlier than, later than or simultaneous with others. For some philosophers, this shows that all we need is the notion of a state, and no independent notion of an event. (Alternatively, they might, like Lewis (1986) and Kim (1976) Here though, my concern is with consciousness, with the phenomenal, with the apparent metaphysics of how things seem; and not with the fundamental metaphysics. The distinction between the state of something -(e.g. the shape of the tree outside my window) and an event (e.g. the woodpecker pecking against its bark)
-is a distinction which it is easy to appreciate from within consciousness. Whether the fundamental reality of the universe is event-or state-like is a further question.
In § §2-3 I argued that we should think of A-conscious states (for example, so- In contemporary terminology, occurrences of all three kinds are manifestations of our capacity for 'self-knowledge' (see Cassam 1994) . The term 'self-knowledge' is misleading in a number of different ways: we are not talking here about knowledge of the self, but of the special kind of epistemic access that we have our own states of mind, and events in our mind. Hence, the awareness we have of our own sensations and experiences is also a form of 'self-knowledge' in this sense. Also, it is questionable whether such awareness is itself knowledge, or whether it is simply something that makes knowledge possible. (Compare: is perception itself knowledge, or is it something that makes knowledge possible?) Nonetheless, these qualifications made, we can take 'self-knowledge' in the contemporary sense to be a term for the distinctive capacity to access one's own mind, as opposed to the access one has to the minds of others. In the first kind of case, of the capacity is exercised in coming to believe something (making up one's mind).
In the second kind of case, it is exercised in our spontaneous access to what we believe anyway. And in the third kind of case, the capacity is exercised in our ability to introspect and examine our own beliefs.
But it is important to emphasise that not all thoughts (in my sense) are judgements. Consciously thinking something can be pursued without the desire to commit to the truth of any particular proposition thought. One could simply be considering something, without needing or wanting to make up one's mind. Such speculation takes place against a background of belief, of course; but not all of these beliefs need to be brought to mind in order for one to speculate.
Conscious thoughts, then, are episodes. My claim is that without employing the idea of a phenomenally conscious episode, it is not possible to make sense of what underlies the talk of 'conscious belief' or 'access (A) consciousness'. It is true that information could be used by a cognitive system, and hence 'accessed' even at the level of the information-processing in the brain. But there is no reason to call this kind of 'accessing' a kind of consciousness. The only point of saying that these states are A-conscious, as far as I can see, is to mark the fact that they can manifest themselves in consciousness. And the same applies to the talk of 'conscious belief'.
We are now in a position to answer the question with which I began this paper: are thoughts and sensations/sensory experiences conscious in the same way? Is there a single sense of 'conscious' in which all these otherwise very different mental phenomena are conscious? My answer is that they are conscious in the same way, because thoughts and sensory experiences are episodes or events in the 'stream' of a subject's consciousness. Of course, this is not a definition of the sense in which they are conscious, because it appeals to the idea of a stream of consciousness. But the image of the stream is supposed to tell us something significant about the structure of conscious phenomena. It is essential that thoughts or episodes of thinking, like sensations and sensory experiences, are occurrences: they are events or processes that have a particular temporal extent and duration. This is compatible with sensations and thoughts differing in all sorts of other ways (for example, in the extent to which it is intelligible to think of them as subject to constraints of reason or rationality). But what I have been arguing for here is the fundamental similarity between them, rather than any differences.
Finally, we have seen that the other thing sensations and conscious thoughts have in common is that they can both be known by the exercise of our capacity for self-knowledge -or, as I would prefer to say, they are both available to the subject through privileged access. Why this is, and what the exact connection is between nonconscious states of mind like beliefs and our capacity to know these states with privileged access, are questions which must be left to another occasion.
Conclusion: phenomenal intentionality and conscious thought
What are the implications of the answer to our question for the idea of phenomenal intentionality?
The first implication is that if we want to look for phenomenal intentionality outside the less controversial examples (e.g. perceptual experience), we should not be asking ourselves whether beliefs exhibit a phenomenal character of their own. If phenomenal character is the character of phenomenal episodes, and these are episodes in the stream of consciousness, then since beliefs are not episodes in the stream of consciousness, beliefs can never have phenomenal character. But thoughts -in the sense characterized in §4 above -do have phenomenal character, since they are episodes in the stream of consciousness.
The next question is whether thoughts have phenomenal character of their own: i.e. phenomenal character which is not the character of some other kind of episode. It is true that some thoughts are accompanied by imagery or words (talking to yourself, words running through your mind, images coming to you). But part of the phenomenal character of the experience is something that cannot be conveyed by these sensory or linguistic representations: it is the attitudinal component of the thought. Maybe the 'vehicle' of the content of a conscious thought is words running through your mind; but the attitude (judging, hoping, desiring etc) cannot be. There need be no words which correspond to the attitude when you judge that p rather than manifest hope that p: you do not have to verbally articulate your attitude in order for the thought to involve that attitude. To develop this argument properly would be the next stage in the defence of the thesis that conscious thoughts have a phenomenal intentionality to call their own. But the first stage is to get a correct view of the
